Distributed oblivious transfer (DOT) was introduced by Naor and Pinkas (2000) [31] , and then generalized to (k, )-DOT-
Introduction
In an oblivious transfer protocol a sender sends information to a receiver such that the sender is oblivious to the information it sends. Specifically, in a one-out-of-n oblivious transfer, denoted by n 1 -OT, the sender has n secrets W 1 , . . . , W n , the receiver has an index i ∈ [n], and the sender communicates W i to the receiver such that the receiver learns no information about the remaining secrets and the sender knows nothing about i. The notion of oblivious transfer was introduced by Rabin [36] and then redefined in the form of 2 1 -OT by Even et al. [19] and n 1 -OT by Brassard et al. [10] , respectively. The 2 1 -OT, n 1 -OT and Rabin's OT have been shown equivalent to each other [9, 17] . As an important cryptographic primitive, oblivious transfer has found fundamental applications in cryptographic studies and protocol design [23, 24, 30, 11, 15, 25] . Oblivious transfer has been implemented under a variety of assumptions [36, 19, 7, 32, 1, 22, 26, 29] . However, these implementations are computationally secure and involve heavy public-key operations. Naor and Pinkas [31] introduced distributed oblivious transfers (DOT) which are information-theoretically secure and computationally efficient. Specifically, their (k, )-DOT- 2 1 protocols [31] are based on polynomial interpolation and only involve arithmetic operations over finite fields.
Subsequently, the (k, )-DOT- 2 1 was generalized to (k, )-DOTn 1 for any positive integer n by Blundo et al. [8] and Nikov et al. [34] . Informally, a (k, )-DOTn 1 (see Fig. 1 ) involves a sender D who has n secrets W 1 , . . . , W n , a receiver U who has an index i ∈ [n], and servers S 1 , . . . , S . It consists of a setup stage when the sender D distributes the secrets among the servers by sending to each server S h a message, and an oblivious transfer stage when the receiver U contacts k out of the servers to compute the secret W i . It is required that D learns no information on i and U learns no more information except W i . More precisely, a (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOTn 1 protocol should satisfy: (I) after the oblivious transfer stage, any coalition of up to t servers learns no information on i; (II) before the oblivious transfer stage, the receiver learns no information on the sender's secrets, even if it colludes with up to τ servers; (III) after the oblivious transfer stage, a malicious receiver is able to obtain at most one of the n secrets, even if it colludes with up to τ malicious servers.
Distributed oblivious transfers have important applications in the privacy preserving architecture of Naor et al. [33] . The architecture involves an auction issuer, several auctioneers and numerous bidders. Typically, in privacy preserving auctions, the auctioneers publish the details of the auctions they are organizing, receive both encrypted bids from the bidders and garbled programs from the auction issuer, and then compute and publish the auctions. The privacy of the bidders is preserved as long as the auction issuer and auctioneers do not collude. Let the auction issuer play the roles of sender and servers and the auctioneer play the role of receiver in the DOT model. Then any DOT protocol provides a solution for the privacy preserving auction problem. The known (k, )-DOTn 1 protocols require the receiver to communicate Ω(n) bits with the contacted servers for retrieving one secret. The communication cost is unaffordable whenever n is large. Therefore, for a DOT-based privacy preserving auction, the auctioneers necessarily communicate a large number of bits with the auction issuer in order to compute and publish an auction. In the described scenario, communication-efficient DOT protocols, in which the receiver and servers exchange a much smaller number of bits, are preferred.
In this work, we construct communication-efficient DOT protocols. We propose both a specific reduction from communication-efficient (k, )-DOTn 1 to polynomial interpolation-based information-theoretic private information retrieval (PIR) [14, 5, 38] and a general reduction from communication-efficient (k, )-DOTn 1 to any information-theoretic PIR. The specific reduction yields DOT protocols of sublinear communication complexity between the receiver and servers. The general reduction yields extremely communication-efficient DOT protocols due to the recent progress in the research of PIR and locally decodable codes (LDCs) [39, 18] .
Related work Private information retrieval (PIR).
A t-private k-server information-theoretic private information retrieval protocol [14] allows a user U to retrieve a data item W i from k servers S 1 , . . . , S k , each of which has a copy of the database W = W 1 , . . . , W n , such that any coalition of up to t servers learns no information on i. The efficiency of a PIR protocol is measured by its communication complexity, i.e., the total number of bits exchanged between the user and servers. Chor et al. [14] proved that in a single-server information-theoretic PIR protocol, the user has to exchange Ω(n) bits for retrieving one data item. On the other hand, if there are k 2 non-communicating servers, then the communication complexity can be as small as O (n 1/k ). There are numerous constructions [14, 2, 6, 5, 38, 39, 18, 28, 12] of PIR protocols. The most efficient 1-private 2-server and 3-server PIR protocols are of communication complexity O (n 1/3 ) [14] and exp(O ( log n log log n)) [18] , respectively. For k > t > 1, the t-private PIR protocols [5, 38] , one may think that there is a dummy sender D who distributes the database W to servers in any kserver PIR protocol (see Fig. 1 ). In this comparative PIR model, the secrets of D are completely disclosed to the servers and, furthermore, the user is not prevented from obtaining more information than what he is interested in (e.g., an execution of the 2-server PIR protocol of [14] reveals O (n 1/3 ) secrets to U ).
Symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR).
In a t-private k-server symmetrically private information retrieval [21] , a user U is allowed to retrieve a data item W i from k-servers S 1 , . . . , S k , each of which has a copy of the database W , such that any coalition of up to t-servers learns no information on i and U learns no more information except W i . Gertner et al. [21] proposed both general reductions and specific reductions from SPIR to PIR in the common random string model (i.e., all servers share a common random string X ). In particular, their reductions preserve the asymptotic communication complexity of the underlying PIR protocols and require the use of a small number of additional auxiliary servers. One may think that there is a dummy sender D who distributes W and X to all servers in an SPIR protocol (see Fig. 1 ). In this comparative SPIR model, the secrets of D are completely disclosed to the servers. Therefore, SPIR does not provide solutions for DOT.
Random server model for private information retrieval (RPIR).
In the PIR and SPIR models, the database W is replicated among multiple non-communicating servers. This data replication problem may be serious because each server could be broken into or sell the database behind the legitimate database owner's back. Gertner et al. [20] suggested that the database owner secret-shares W among random servers instead of simply replicating W among non-communicating servers. A PIR protocol in this random server model consists of a setup stage when the database owner D shares W among the random severs and an on-line stage when the user U retrieves a data item W i by interacting with the random servers (see Fig. 1 ). Gertner et al.
[20] proposed a general reduction from RPIR to PIR. Specifically, in order to preserve the asymptotic communication complexity of the underlying PIR protocols, their reduction requires a large number of random servers. As most PIR protocols, the RPIR protocols cannot prevent a user from obtaining more information than what he is interested in.
Locally random reduction (LRR).
A (t, k)-locally random reduction [4] allows a user to evaluate a function f at a private input i with the help of k servers, each of which has a reduced form of the function f , such that any coalition of up to t servers learns no information on i. As PIR and RPIR, LRR cannot prevent the user from learning more information on f than f (i).
Commodity-based private information retrieval (cbPIR).
A commodity-based private information retrieval [16] involves a user who wants to retrieve W i of a database W , a number of database servers which have W and commodity severs which send off-line messages (called commodities). A cbPIR consists of an off-line commodity stage when the commodity servers send commodities to the user and database servers and an on-line retrieval stage when the user retrieves W i by interacting with the database servers. Although the commodity servers do not have any information on the database, the messages they send in the off-line commodity stage dramatically reduce the overall communication involving the user in the on-line retrieval stage. As PIR, RPIR and LRR, a cbPIR cannot prevent the user from obtaining more information on W than what he is interested in.
Private information storage (PIS).
A private information storage [35] allows users to privately read and write into a database W which is shared among a number of non-communicating servers such that each individual server learns absolutely no information on which location the users are reading or writing, and what the users are writing into the database. Ostrovsky et al. [35] built their PIS schemes on information-theoretic PIR. Specifically, they proposed a reduction from PIS to PIR which requires only one additional server and a polylogarithmic overhead in communication.
As the previous models, PIS does not provide any privacy against malicious users.
Other models. Rivest [37] considered oblivious transfers in the trusted initializer model. A n 1
-OT in this model involves a sender who has n secrets, a receiver who wants to learn one of the n secrets and a trusted initializer. It consists of a setup stage when the trusted initializer sends private information to the sender and receiver, and a request-reply stage when the receiver learns one secret by interacting with the sender. OT in this model is different from DOT because all secrets are completely disclosed to the sender (playing the role of servers in DOT model) who participates in the on-line request-reply stage and obliviously communicates one secret to the receiver.
Our results
In this work, we propose both a specific reduction from (k, )-DOT- to polynomial interpolation-based PIR. We obtain a non-black-box construction of (t, τ )- protocol of communication complexity exp(O ( log n log log n)) between the receiver and servers such that: (I) after the oblivious transfer stage, each individual server learns absolutely no information about which secret the receiver is interested in; (II) before the oblivious transfer stage, the receiver learns no information about the secrets, even if it colludes with any single server; (III) after the oblivious transfer stage, a malicious receiver is able to obtain at most one of the secrets, even if it colludes with one malicious server.
For some settings of the parameters and k, our reductions are inefficient in terms of setup complexity, i.e., each server may receive O (
) field elements in the setup stage. However, this complexity becomes reasonable if = k and t is a constant less than k. Note that DOT protocols in a setting where = k have been considered by Cheong et al. [13] .
Our reductions are efficient for that setting.
Organization
In Section 2, we provide both an informal and a formal definition of (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-
, and develop several related information equalities; in Section 3, we present our specific reduction from DOT to polynomial interpolationbased information-theoretic private information retrieval; in Section 4, we present our general reduction from DOT to any information-theoretic private information retrieval; in Section 5 we give an evaluation of both reductions; finally, in Section 6, we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we define (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOTn 1 protocols and develop related information equalities which effectively simplify our security proofs. Our definition follows the vein of [8] and has the strongest requirement for sender's privacy which is called sender's privacy II in our definition.
protocols achieving sender's privacy II have been called strongly private in [8] and are necessarily multi-round. However, our construc- -Correctness: The receiver U is able to correctly determine W i after the oblivious transfer stage; -Receiver's privacy: A coalition of up to t servers learns no information on i after the oblivious transfer stage; -Sender's privacy I: A coalition of U and up to τ servers learns no information on W before the oblivious transfer stage; -Sender's privacy II: Given the transcript of communication with k servers, a coalition of U and up to τ malicious servers learns at most one secret.
Informal description of (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOT-

Formalization of correctness and privacy
LetŪ andS h be the corrupted U and S h . We define the related random variables as follows: 
Let U j be a random variable for every j ∈ N. For any J ⊆ N, we denote by
be the binary entropy of U. Let U be a random variable. We denote by Pr[U = u | u ] the conditional probability that U = u given that U = u .
Assumptions: As in [34, 8] , our formal definitions and security proofs are based on the following assumptions (1)- (8):
-The random input of U is truly random and independent of the inputs of D, i.e., it holds that:
(1) -The random input of D is truly random and independent of the inputs of U , i.e., it holds that:
-The private input of U is independent of any other data in the setup stage, i.e., it holds that:
-Every index i ∈ [n] will be the choice of U with positive probability, i.e., it holds that:
-The secrets are all totally independent of each other, i.e., for every
-For every K ⊆ [ ], the messages sent to S K = {S h : h ∈ K } are determined by the inputs of D:
-For every K ⊆ [ ], the queries sent to S K are determined by the inputs of U :
3 The sender's n secrets are assumed to be implication-free in Section 4.1 of [8] , i.e., H(W i | W j ) > 0 whenever i = j. However, it is pointed out in Section 4.1 of [8] that the secrets are usually independent.
-For every K ⊆ [ ], the answers of S K are determined by the queries and messages it received:
Correctness: The protocol P is said to be correct if for every i ∈ [n] and 
-Sender's privacy II:
Related information equalities
In this section, we shall prove several information equalities on the random variables defined in Section 2.2. These equalities capture the essence of our definition of privacy and simplify the security proofs.
The first equality (see Lemma 1) shows that a set of corrupted servers can learn information on what the receiver is interested in only from the queries they may obtain from the receiver. Intuitively, this is true because the messages the corrupted servers may obtain are from either the sender or the receiver. However, the messages from the sender convey no information on what the receiver is interested in.
Due to (7), we have H(Q T | I, Y) = 0 and therefore H(D T ) H(D T | Q T ) H(D T | Q T , I) H(D T | Y, I). Hence, it suffices to show that H(D T ) = H(D T | Y, I). Due to (3), we have that H(D T
| Y) − H(D T | Y, I) = H(I | Y) − H(I | Y, D T ) = 0
and therefore H(D T | Y, I) = H(D T | Y). Hence, we turn to show that H(D T ) = H(D T | Y). Due to (6) and (1), we have that H(Y) H(Y
The second equality (see Lemma 2) shows that before the oblivious transfer stage any coalition of the receiver and a set of corrupted servers can learn information on the secrets of the sender only from what the corrupted servers may obtain from the sender during the setup stage. Intuitively, this is true because the input and random input of the receiver convey no information on the sender's secrets. 4 Following Section 2.2 of [8] , we suppose that for every h ∈ [ ] the message D h contains the random bits needed by S h in an execution of the protocol and, without loss of generality, the server S h is deterministic. 5 We are analyzing unconditionally secure protocols. Therefore, following Section 2.2 of [8] , we can suppose that the corrupted receiver is deterministic.
Lemma 2. In a one-round (k, )-DOT-
For simplicity, we suppose that i is the fixed input actually contributed byŪ and Y is the fixed random input used byŪ , respectively. In case i is not in
e., the receiverŪ learns nothing.
Actually, due to (6) and (1)
, which implies the desired equality. 2
The last equality (see Lemma 3) shows that given the transcript of the communication between the receiver and the servers labeled by a k-subset K ⊆ [ ], any coalition of the receiver and a set of corrupted servers labeled by T ⊆ [ ] can learn more information on the sender's secrets only from the messages that S T may obtain from the sender and the answers that the receiver may obtain from the servers S K \T . Intuitively, this is true because the servers are assumed to be deterministic and the answers of the servers S K ∩T could have been computed by themselves using the messages from both the sender and the receiver. 
Proof. Due to (9) and (8), we have that
which implies the first equality of (15) . Similarly, the second equality of (15) holds. to polynomial interpolation-based information-theoretic PIR in the presence of semi-honest receivers.
PIR based on polynomial interpolation
Let S 1 , . . . , S k be k servers, each of which has a copy of the database W = W 1 , . . . , W n . Let U be a user who has an index i ∈ [n] and wants to retrieve W i from the servers without revealing i. A t-private k-server polynomial interpolationbased private information retrieval protocol (see Protocol 1) is an (n + 1)-tuple P = (E; P 1 
The polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols of [5, 38] are summarized in Appendix A.
Reduction in the presence of semi-honest receivers
Let P = (E; P 1 , . . . , P n ) be a t-private (k − τ )-server polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocol. Protocol 2, described below, converts P to a (t, τ )-private (k, )-DOTn 1 protocol. During the setup stage, the sender D shares the secrets using Shamir's τ -private threshold sharing scheme (TSSS) with every k-subset of the servers. During the oblivious transfer stage, the receiver U invokes P with k out of the servers.
Protocol 2. (k, )-DOT-
Oblivious transfer stage
Lemma 4. Protocol 2 satisfies the correctness requirement.
Proof. The univariate polynomial
to Lagrange polynomial interpolation, we have that 
Then the random variable representing the messages sent to S h by D is
For every h ∈ [ ], let Q h be the random variable representing the query Q h sent to S h by U . Then we have that
is the random variable representing the answer of S h on receiver's query Q h and sender's message
Let T be the collection of all τ -subsets of [ ]. 
. , B n (λ).
For a specific τ -subset T = {1, 2, . . . , τ } ∈ T , we define
, where Λ occurs exactly n times.
Lemma 5. Protocol 2 satisfies the receiver's privacy requirement.
Proof. Let S T = {S h : h ∈ T } be any coalition of t servers, where T is a t-subset of [ ]. We show that the receiver's index is protected, that is a coalition of t servers do not learn any information about the index. We need to show that H(I | D T , Q T ) = H(I). Due to Lemma 1, it suffices to show that H(I | Q T ) = H(I). For every i ∈ [n] and Q T = (Q
mt due to the privacy of Shamir's t-private TSSS. It follows that I and Q T are independent.
Hence, H(I | Q T ) = H(I). 2
The following lemma shows any coalition of τ servers and the user has no information about the secrets after the setup stage.
Lemma 6. Protocol 2 satisfies the sender's privacy I requirement.
Proof. Let S T be a set of servers colluding with U , where T ∈ T is arbitrary. For simplicity, we suppose that T = {1, 2, . .
. , τ }. Due to Lemma 2, it suffices to show H(W | D T ) = H(W). It is obvious that
On the other hand, we have that . . . 
H(W | X B,T ) = H(W). 2
Finally, we prove privacy after the oblivious transfer stage.
Lemma 7. Protocol 2 satisfies the sender's privacy II requirement.
Proof. Let i ∈ [n], K ∈ K and T ∈ T be arbitrary. For simplicity, we suppose
be the random vectors chosen by U . Due to Lemma 3, it suffices to show that 
, where X k,T and X B,T are in the domains of X k,T and X B,T , respectively. Clearly, X k,T is independent of W Γ for fixed i and Y in Protocol 2. For every h ∈ T and K ∈ K such that h ∈ K , the server S h receives a random field element X K ,h . It follows that S h receives exactly 
. (22) Due to Eq. (15), we have that 
The choice of X B,T in Protocol 2 should be consistent with the value of W and independent of any other data. Therefore, as in the proof of Lemma 6, we have that (24) Due to Eqs. (7), (16) and (18) 
in the oblivious transfer stage of Protocol 2). Hence,
Due to Eq. (21), p 1 is equal to the product of the left-hand sides of Eqs. (22), (23), (24) and (25) . Hence, we have that 
Communication complexity. The receiver sends to each server S h a vector Q h ∈ F m q and a subset K ∈ K as its query and receives an answer A h ∈ F q in return. Therefore, the communication complexity between the receiver and servers is γ (n) = k(m + 1) log q + log k . The polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols enumerated in Appendix A require
). Hence, we have that:
) between a semi-honest receiver and servers.
Reducing (k, )-DOTn 1 to any PIR
In this section, we build communication-efficient DOT from any PIR. The privacy of any 1-private PIR protocols can be boosted without increasing the asymptotic communication complexity due to the transformation of [3] . On the other hand, [21] provides a method of converting any PIR to SPIR without increasing the asymptotic communication complexity. Eventually, the reduction from DOT to SPIR (see Protocol 3) enables us to build DOT from any PIR.
Replication-based threshold secret sharing scheme. A τ -private k-participant replication-based threshold secret sharing scheme CNF τ ,k (based on [27] ) involves a dealer D who has a secret g ∈ G and k participants S 1 , . . . , S k , where G is an abelian group. The scheme proceeds as follows: (I) The dealer D chooses k τ random group elements, each of which is indexed by
The τ -privacy of CNF τ ,k follows from the fact that any τ participants S T do not know the share g T .
Reduction from (k, )-DOT-
to any t-private (k − τ )-server SPIR by the following Protocol 3. During the setup stage, the sender D distributes the secrets W among each k-subset of servers S K using CNF τ ,k . During the oblivious transfer stage, the receiver U interacts with k out of the servers. Specifically, U invokes an instance of the SPIR with each subset of k − τ servers S K \T , where
Input of U : an index i ∈ [n].
Oblivious transfer stage
Let K ∈ K, T ∈ T be such that T ⊆ K . For every h ∈ K \ T , we denote by Q K ,T ,h the random variable representing the query sent to S h by U when the P instance between U and S K \T is invoked. For any T ⊆ [ ], we denote by
Lemma 8. Protocol 3 satisfies the correctness requirement.
Proof. Due to the correctness of P, for every T ∈ T such that T ⊆ K , it holds that Φ K ,T = [W K ,T ] i and therefore
Lemma 9. Protocol 3 satisfies the receiver's privacy requirement.
Proof. Let S K be the set of servers interacted by U and T ∈ T be a subset of K . Due to the user privacy of P, for every
Since the instances of P are totally independent of each other, it holds that
However, we have that 
The sender D invokes k instances of CNF τ ,k which are totally independent of each other. Let K ∈ K be arbitrary.
Let W ∈ F n q be arbitrary and D T = (D K , ,T : K ∈ K) be any message tuple sent to S T by D. Since the CNF τ ,k instance are totally independent of each other, we have that Proof. Let S K and S T be the servers interacted by U and colluding with U respectively, where K ∈ K and T ∈ T . Let T * be the set of all τ -subsets of K , T *
Furthermore, τ = |T ∩ K | τ and δ = |T *
T ∈ T * ) be the fixed index, random input and query of U , respectively. For every T ∈ T * , an instance of P is invoked between U and S K \T with W K ,T as the database. We denote
Semi-honest case. For every T ∈ T * , consider the instance P between a semi-honest U and S K \T . Due to the data privacy of P, it holds that
Therefore, for every
, it holds that
Due to (8) and (7), we have that
Due to (15) , it suffices to show that
Let A K ,T * 
On the other hand, due to (8), we have that
Eqs. (27) and (28) imply that
It follows that p W = p W due to Eqs. (26) and (29) . Hence, (A K ,T * 1 , D T ) and W are independent as long as i, Y K and W i are fixed, i.e., (28) holds and sender's privacy II is satisfied if U is semi-honest.
Malicious case. Let S K and S T be the servers interacted by U and colluding with U respectively, where K ∈ K and T ∈ T . In order to learn as much information as possible, it is not hard to see that T should be a subset of K , i.e., T ∈ T * . Due to the τ -privacy of the CNF τ ,k TSSS, the coalition ofŪ and server S T is able to learn W as long as the share W K ,T is known.
Consider the instance P betweenŪ and S K \T . IfŪ contributes no valid index, then the coalition learns no information on W K ,T and therefore it learns no information on W . IfŪ contributes an index j ∈ [n], then the coalition learns at most the secret W j due to the data privacy of the instance P betweenŪ and S K \T and the privacy of CNF τ ,k . protocol of communication complexity exp(O ( log n log log n)) between the receiver and servers.
Evaluation of the reductions
In this section, we evaluate our reductions. Specifically, we compare them with known constructions of DOT and with each other. which achieves the same privacy whenever t + τ = k − 1. Hence, the specific reduction shows a tradeoff between receiverserver communication complexity and privacy. The specific reduction is secure for semi-honest receivers. It is left open to modify the specific reduction such that the sender's privacy I and II can be achieved for malicious receivers. On the other hand, our general reduction is fully secure.
Receiver-server communication complexity. Let t, τ be positive integers. It has been proved by [34] obtained by the general reduction is more efficient due to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1. Hence, we prefer the general reduction. Furthermore, for small values of t and τ , the reduction given by Corollary 2 is much better than those given by Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 since it is based on the 3-server PIR protocols of extremely small communication complexity exp(O ( log n log log n)).
Number of interacted servers. For availability, the receiver should interact with a small number of servers. The specific reduction of Theorem 1 achieves the lower bound given by [34] and therefore is optimal in terms of the number of interacted servers. In contrast, the general reductions of Corollaries 1 and 2 require k 3t+1 2
+ τ and k = 3 t + t + τ , respectively. Hence, they are not optimal in terms of the number of interacted servers.
Setup complexity. The setup complexity of our reductions may be large for some settings of the parameters and k. For example, in the setup stage of our specific reduction, each server receives
random masks (field elements) and an m-variate polynomial of small constant degree; in the setup stage of our general reduction from DOT to SPIR, each server receives
shares (vectors of n field elements) of the database and k k t random masks (field elements). However, the setup complexity becomes reasonable if = k and t is a constant less than k. We note that the DOT protocols in a setting where = k have been considered by Cheong et al. [13] . Our reductions are efficient for that setting.
Independence of secrets. We assume that the sender's secrets are totally independent in Section 2.2, i.e., Eq. (5) holds. However, our security proofs for the general reduction from DOT to SPIR in Section 4 do not depend on this assumption. On the other hand, the assumption is necessary for our specific reduction.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study DOT of sublinear communication complexity between the receiver and servers. We present both a specific reduction from DOT to polynomial interpolation-based PIR and a general reduction from DOT to any PIR. The specific reduction yields DOT protocols which are optimal in terms of the number of interacted servers and are secure for semi-honest receivers. The general reduction yields DOT protocols of extremely small communication complexity between the receiver and servers and are secure for malicious receivers. The setup complexity of our reductions could be large for some settings of the parameters. It is an open problem to reduce the setup complexity of our reductions.
Appendix A. Polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols
We enumerate four polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols in this appendix. Originally, the first two do not follow the framework depicted by Protocol 1. However, from our point of view, they fall into the framework of polynomial interpolation-based PIR protocols.
A.1. Beimel-Ishai-Kushilevitz PIR Protocol I [5]
-Let Ω = {v ∈ {0, 
